SCADA Security: An Attack Tolerant Approach

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Abstract

To answer the cyber-attacks on SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems, we wonder whether an attack tolerant approach can be implemented. Indeed, the most of networked control system security mechanisms are based on detection and rejection of the cyber-attacks control data. This rejection is easy to be detected by the attackers. As a result, the attackers will continue to improving their strategy in order to break down the security mechanism. They try until they reach their goals, and generally, during this time, there is no indication about presence of cyber-attacks. In addition to specific algorithms such Data Encryption Standard (DES), Message Digest (MD5), timestamp, a new security mechanism based on the deception for the cyber-attacks is proposed. This mechanism, from a mathematical model of the plant, can make that the attackers believe that he has achieved the wished purpose, as they receive indication on their actions within the sensor reading. As a result, the attackers stop to improve their attack method. So, to answer the cyber-attacks on SCADA System, an attack tolerant approach is proposed.

1. Introduction

The distributed architectures are currently implemented in control system. Indeed the use of networks, to allow the components to communicate in these architectures, offers a best flexibility in design at the functional level as well as the hardware level [1]. They are applied in a broad range of system such as chemical plants, refineries, power plans, electrical power grids, manufacturing plants and so on. Depending of their applications, they have various names: Process Control Systems (PCS), Distributed Control Systems (DCS), Cyber-Physical Systems CPS (for embedded sensors and actuators networks), SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) or Networked Control Systems.

The distributed automation systems are functionally divided into various levels. At the lowest level, the input/ output level (I/O level), the network devices are in direct contact with the process via the sensors and the actuators, and communicate measurement data to the control level, or receive control signals from the control level. Specific networks have been gradually replaced by Ethernet network. Fig. 1 shows an architecture of SCADA system.

The advantages of such an architecture are its flexibility, its ability to data process a lot of information in order to improve the productivity and to reduce maintenance costs. They realize various functions and, in particular they control system. However, due to the control loop which is closed over a real-time network, there are disadvantages due to the network effects that influence the performance and stability of the control loop, such as time-delays, packet dropouts. However, the most important disadvantage is that the integration of Ethernet networks with other networks in SCADA system has made SCADA vulnerable to cyber-attacks [2].

The cyber-attacks include the data modification, deceptive sender identity, and data replay since they relate to active attacks [3].

Related to the cyber-attacks problems, several methods were described for security mechanism of SCADA systems or more generally Networked Control Systems (NCS). In [4], network security algorithms DES (Data Encryption Standard), 3DES (Triple Data Encryption Standard), and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) are integrated with the application to secure the sensor as well as control data flow on the network, 1-D gain scheduler was designed and implemented to alleviate the adverse effect due to security. In [5] the DES and message digest 5 (MD5) are integrated with the application to encrypt the data transmitted on the network and detect their integrity. The trade-off between
NCS security and its real-time performance was demonstrated in [6]. A quick detection approach against data-injection attack in the smart grid was introduced in [7]. The Named Data Networking (NDN) was used in [8] in order to prevent the most attacks that IP-based systems are vulnerable to. The authors in [9] design a detection module based on implementation of DES algorithm, furthermore, to protect NCSs from getting out of control, the authors design also a response module. The DES was adopted in [10] as security solutions for the DC motor networked control system in TrueTime platform algorithm.

However, in all the mentioned methods [4] - [10], the injected control data by the cyber-attacks can be only detected and rejected. Therefore, the attacker will continue to improve his strategy to break the SCADA system security by the trial and error method. Normally, this method is based on the monitoring ability to the actual sensor reading which supplies by the recent security mechanisms in case of the break of its encryption. Furthermore, the attacks control data rejection always are done in remote plant side without any notification in controller side. As an example, the DES key, which is used by the most of previous researches that deals with the security of SCADA system, this DES key publicly has been broken in 22 hours and 15 minutes in January 1999 [11].

2. Towards attack-tolerant SCADA system

Network security can be defined as the measures and policies adopted by a network administrator to prevent and monitor unauthorized access, misuse, modification, or denial of a computer network and network-accessible resources [12]. The previous researches that are dealt with SCADA security were tried to apply the security tools, which designed for all types of networks. The main orientation of these tools is the prevention but SCADA systems demand to be real time operating and must continuously functioning.

Most of the computer security research focus on confidentiality, so what will be happened if the prevention is broken? The control system will receive a faulty response and in this case, it’s a new type of fault due to the attack (we call it “attack fault”)

In this paper, we propose a fault tolerant method. It’s a data processing for the attack fault which occurs when the cryptography is broken. This method will be named “Attack-Tolerant”, this method is based on reconfiguration of the sensor reading. On other hand, the proposed method will be stopped the attack fault improving as will be described in the next section.

3. Stopping the attack fault improvement

In general, the attacker’s algorithm can be summarized as in Fig.2. The logical behavior of all attackers is based on the development of a method of attacks by reading the information sent back via the network, of a sensor of a spied plant. The attacker will try to control the remote system: as he receives no answer, he tries again and adopts a new method.

In this paper, a new scenario for security mechanism is given. This mechanism allows, on one hand, to delude the attacker that he has succeeded in injection of deceptive control data to the remote plant as new control signal instead of original legal control signal, and on the other hand, to prevent the attack signal to perturb the system. The method makes that the algorithm of the aggressor becomes invisible and weak by discontinueing the core of its development (The block of correcting and updating in Fig.2). The Fig.3 illustrating what will be the status of attacker’s algorithm against the proposed security mechanism.

Furthermore, an indication about an attempt to take the control of the plant by unauthorized person is available in the local controller side.
4. Common security components

Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 illustrate the complete block diagram for the plant side and controller side of the proposed SCADA system. There are three common security components located in both system sides (i.e. controller & Plant); these components can be summarized as follows:

4.1. Data confidentiality

The typical symmetric ciphers for Networked Control System data confidentiality are DES, 3DES and AES. The total time for encryption as well as decryption depends upon the packet length between controller and the plant. AES induces the greatest duration, 3DES is faster but the most performant according to the induced time delay is DES [3]. Due to its fast speed, DES algorithm is the most commonly used symmetric cipher. Therefore, in this paper, the DES algorithm is choose to perform data encryption. DES algorithm is symmetric cipher, which transforms a 64-bit plaintext (controller or sensor data) into a 64-bit ciphertext. Fig. 4 shows DES general structure.

![DES General Structure](image)

Figure 4. DES General Structure

The main process of encryption is consists of the following four stages.
- Initial permutation replacement.
- Round-key generator, which generates 48-bits of key from 56-bit key to be used in each round (sub key).
- Sixteen rounds of the identical iterations, which include permutations, substitutions and XOR operations.
- In order to produce the ciphertext, the output of the last round will be passed through a final permutation.

However, to secure data flows over the network, the used of data encryption alone is not sufficient because, data tampering attacks to the sensor and/or control data, for example, cannot be prevented by the data encryption, which can significantly impair the system performance or even lead to loss of control of SCADA systems [12].

4.2 Data integrity

In order to checking the Integrity of the SCADA data, one-way hash function is used. One-way hash functions accept a variable size message as input and produce a fixed-size output, called hash code. MD5 hashes are used to ensure the data integrity of the received control signals at the plant side and the received sensor signals at the controller side. An MD5 hash is NOT encryption. It is simply a fingerprint of the given input. However, it is a one-way transaction and as such, it is almost impossible to reverse engineer an MD5 hash to retrieve the original string. The MD5 takes an input of arbitrary length and produces a message digest that is 128-bits long. The MD5 algorithm initializes four 32-bit variables (A, B, C, D). These four variables are with predefined values at the beginning, then for each 32-bit block of data it continually calculates the value of hash. Fig. 5 illustrates the basic operations of MD5, where, F is a nonlinear function. M[i] denotes one message word input, and T[i] denotes a 32-bit constant selected from a stationary table containing 64 constants definite in the specification. S denotes a 5-bit input that controls the left bit rotation of the input sum. MD5 involves of 64 of these operations, gathered in four rounds of 16 operations. After 64 basic operations, the chaining variable is updated by immediately adding the 4 variables (A, B, C, D) with the recent content in the chaining variable.

Because the MD5 hash algorithm always produces the same output for the same given input. The deception attacks (except the data replay attack) can be detected by comparing the hash of the source data (i.e. actual controller signal or sensor reading) with a newly created hash of the destination side (i.e. controller side or plant side) to check that it is intact and unmodified.

![Basic operations of MD5](image)

Figure 5. Basic operations of MD5
4.3. Data Replay Detection

Timestamp is used for detecting the data replay attack as well as to accept only the newest packet from controller side to plant side and vice versa.

5. Network protocol

Due to the real time nature of the SCADA system, UDP is preferred for use in SCADA systems over IP network. Of course, UDP is non-reliable protocol, there are no retransmissions in UDP and the packets may arrive in out-of-sequence manner at the receiver end. Therefore, to use UDP in SCADA systems we must add more reliability to the control system design. This can be done by the following:

- Implementation of generalized predictive control to compensate for packet disorder and packet dropout as well as the induced time delay.
In order to solve the problem of "out-of-sequence", timestamp is used to accept only the newest packet that sent from the authorized controller side and refusing the old one.

6. Attack-tolerant scheme

The attack-tolerant scheme is design to serve the continuity of the SCADA works when the data confidentiality is broken.

In additional to the attack detection, the attack-tolerant scheme helps to making the attacker believes that he has achieved the desired goal and as a result, the attacker stops the attack method improvement. Furthermore, an indication about the attacks will be included within the sensor reading.

There are two parts of the attack-tolerant scheme; the first part is located in the plant side and the second one in the controller side.

6.1. Data Plant Side Attack-Tolerant Scheme

The internal diagram of “Plant Side Attack-Tolerant Scheme” block in Fig 6 is illustrated as in Fig. 8.

![Figure 8. The internal diagram of the plant side attack-tolerant scheme](image)

The attack detection and separation unit receives three inputs, \( U_{\text{rec}}(k) \) (which represents either authorized, or attacker control signal), timestamp and hash code as mentioned in section 4.

Attack detection will be utilized from the received MD5 hash codes to check the integrity as well as the originality of the received controller signal.

If the received signal is original (i.e. \( U_{\text{actual}}(K) \)) then timestamp is used in order to prevent the control signal from access the actual plant if it is delayed or replied.

If there is, no integrity or replay detected, then the received signal will be classified as an attack control signal \( U_{\text{attack}}(K) \). In order to have plant output that related to the attack control signal, \( U_{\text{attack}}(K) \) will be sent to the plant mathematical model.

In the sensor reading formation unit, the sensor reading of the actual plant \( Y_{\text{actual}}(k) \) will be included in the response of plant model in a manner that makes the attacker believes he has achieved the desired goal.

In this paper, we introduce the sensor reading formation technique for attack-tolerant. This technique can be implemented with various software algorithms; one of the possible algorithms is shown in. Fig. 9, which represents the overall plant side attack-tolerant software algorithm.

![Figure 9. Overall plant side attack-tolerant software algorithm](image)
Referring to Fig. 9, let \( X(k) \) is the different between the actual sensor reading and the plant model response or \( X(k) = Y_{actual}(K) - Y_{model}(K) \).

The absolute value of \( X(k) \) will be “\( Y^3 Y^2 Y^1 Y^0 \)”.

The value of \( Y_{model}(K) \) will be “\( Y^7 Y^6 Y^5 Y^4 \)”.

If \( X(k) \) is positive then \( Y^4 \) will be odd and vice versa. The final string of the sensor reading \( Y(K) \) will be as follows “\( Y^7 Y^6 Y^5 Y^4 Y^3 Y^2 Y^1 Y^0 \)”.

The uncertainty in actual plant is employed to increase the level of the lack in understanding the actual sensor reading.

**6.2 Controller Side attack-Tolerant Scheme**

At controller side, a timestamp will be appended to the generalized predictive control output \( U_{actual}(K) \), the Message Digest 5 (MD5) is used to generating the hash code of the \( U_{actual}(K) \).

\( U_{actual}(K) \), hash code, and timestamp as a whole are encrypted into one packet and sent to the plant side.

The “Controller side Attack-Tolerant Scheme” block in Fig. 7 performs the following procedures:

- To control side attack detection and rejection.
- To extract the actual sensor reading.
- To detect if there is a plant side attack by checking the received sensor reading formation.

The controller side attack-tolerant scheme receives three inputs, the \( Y_{rec}(k) \) which represents either authorized or attacker sensor reading, timestamp and hash code.

The first procedure is similar to the procedure in the plant side but in controller side, there is only rejection for unauthorized and replied data.

If there is any attack in the plant side that not detected during first procedure, the sensor reading that provided from first procedure will be included with this attack information.

In order to extracting the actual sensor reading and to perform the plant side attack detection, the follows steps are applied, these steps are only compatible to the algorithm which shown in Fig. 9.

- To calculate the percentage between the \( A \) & \( B \) in order send the attack alarm if any (up to 10% is accepted in this paper.).
- To specify the sign of \( A \) according to the value of \( Y^4 \) (i.e. positive for odd or negative for even).
- In addition, in order to have the actual sensor reading, \( A \) will be added to \( B \).

Fig. 10 illustrates the controller side attack-tolerant software algorithm.
7. Predictive controller

Generalized Predictive Control (GPC) has been used in several industrial applications [13]. GPC is used due to its ability to manage with the instability and uncertain which introduced by unknown time delay and data packet loss.

The GPC strategy that used in this paper was described in [14] and can be summarized as follows: In GPC, the plant model of the form CARIMA is:

$$A(z^{-1})Y_{actual}(k) = B(z^{-1})U_{actual}(k) - 1 C(z^{-1})e(k)$$ (1)

where, $U_{actual}(k)$ and $Y_{actual}(k)$ are the control input and output, respectively. $A(z^{-1}), B(z^{-1})$ and $C(z^{-1})$ are polynomials. It is assumed that $e(k)$ is a zero mean white noise giving, $C(z^{-1}) = I$ and $\Delta = 1 - z^{-1}$ is the differencing operator. The quadratic cost function of GPC is:

$$V(H_1, H_2, H_u) = \sum_{j=0}^{H_1} \left\| Y_{actual}(k+j|k) - Y_{des}(k+j) \right\|_2^2 + \sum_{j=1}^{H_u} \left\| \Delta U_{actual}(k+j-1) \right\|_2$$ (2)

Where $H_1, H_2$ and $H_u$ are the minimum, maximum prediction horizons and control horizon, respectively. $Y_{actual}(k+j|k)$ is the $j$ step ahead output prediction at time instant $k$ and $Y_{des}(k+j)$ are the future desired trajectories. $R$ and $Q$ are the weighting matrices. Combining (1) with the Diophantine equation and then the optimal control sequences can be obtained by applying matrix algebraic manipulations:

$$\Delta U_{actual} = \left[ G^T G + Q \right]^{-1} G^T R (Y_{des} - F)$$ (3)

$$\Delta U_{actual} = \left[ \Delta U_{actual}(k) \Delta U_{actual}(k+1) \right]^T$$ (4)

Where, $F, R, G$ are matrices, details of them can be found in [15]. All the elements of $\Delta U_{actual}$ are computed and transmitted over the network to the remote actual plants and then are used to compensate for the delayed and lost packets of the controller and sensor signals.

8. Simulation results

The proposed security mechanism for SCADA systems is developed as per the scheme mentioned above with MATLAB. Position control of networked DC servomotor is selected for testing and for verifying the performance of the designed system.

The parameters and values chosen for motor modeling are as shown in Table 1 [16].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Abbrev</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moment of inertia</td>
<td>$J_m$</td>
<td>0.000052 $Kg.m^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friction coefficient</td>
<td>$B_m$</td>
<td>0.01 N.ms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back EMF constant</td>
<td>$K_b$</td>
<td>0.235 $V/rad.S^{-1}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torque constant</td>
<td>$K_a$</td>
<td>0.235 $Nm/A$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric resistance</td>
<td>$R_a$</td>
<td>2 Ohm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric inductance</td>
<td>$L_a$</td>
<td>0.23 H</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11. Position control over the secure SCADA
system without attacks (a) Actual system response (b) The received sensor signal (Yrec)

Figure 12. Position control over the secure SCADA system with 25% attacks (a) Attack control signal (b) Actual response and the response to the attacker

Actually, the security mechanism maintains the normal response of the position control system (green lines in Fig.12(b) and Fig.13(b)).

However, the sensor reading ‘Yrec’ (red lines in Fig.12(b) and Fig.13(b)) is follows what should be the remote plant response to the attacker signal ‘Uattack’.

9. Conclusion

In this paper, to answer to cyber-attacks on SCADA systems, an attack-tolerant scheme is introduced. The proposed method is based on deception of the cyber-attack when the current available data encryption method is broken.

In addition to the continuity of the control system work, the proposed technique makes the attacker to stop the development of the attack method, to send attack alarm to controller side. This information allows to give time for the authorized person to repair the broken part in the security mechanism.

In order to introduce the proposed technique, simple algorithm for sensor reading formation is described. This method can be extended to be more complex depending on the type of control system application. The investigation reveals that the proposed security mechanism can successfully be used for SCADA systems.
10. References


